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ABSTRACT 
State·chartered credit unions in Virginia are by Statute incorporated and 
regulated by the State Corporation Commission of the Commonwealth. Part of 
the regulatory process is a periodic examination of the books and records of 
each credit union to determine compliance with applicable laws and regulations 
as well as the safety and soundness of depositors' funds. The quality and 
effectiveness of this examination process has never been measured, nor has it 
been empirically evaluated to determine its strengths and weaknesses. This 
study identifies areas of the examination report which can be improved in 
order to make it a more useful regulatory tool and to provide a more meaningful 
reference for regulated credit unions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, bank examinations emphasized credit review, asset appraisal, 
and some auditing or verification of accounts. In Virginia, as in most 
states, credit unions were examined by bank examiners because the regulation 
of all financial institutions was supervised by one regulatory agency~ special-
ization in credit union examination was not deemed necessary probably because 
credit u_nions were relatively small and conducted very simple operations. 
Since credit unions were examined by bank examiners, the credit union examination 
report naturally emphasized traditional bank examination values. This exami-
nation report has survived through the years despite dramatic changes in the 
credit union industry. 
With the idea that the credit union examination report now in use in 
Virginia is outmoded, this study identifies areas necessary for improvement of 
the examination report to provide more information (1) for regulators to better 
determine the financial welfare of a credit union, and (2) for management of a 
credit union to set policies that are conducive to sound financial operations. 
The organizational structure of state financial institution regulatory 
agencies remains basically the same as the traditional concept: of 47 states 
with credit union statutes only five have an independent credit union supervisory 
department. However, expanding organizational autonomy is seen in the increasing 
number of credit union supervisors who can make decisions without securing 
l 
approval from another person or agency. While more than half the states do 
not have minimal educational requirements,2 twenty-four state credit union 
supervisors have college degrees and nine others have 3 graduate degrees. 
The growth of the credit union industry is well documented. While the 
total number of credit unions has declined somewhat in recent years due to 
mergers and liquidations, industry assets as of July 31, 1985, exceeded $131 
-1-
4 
billion while more than 51 million members are served by their credit unions. 
The most recent growth can be in large part attributed to deregulation of the 
financial institution industry which has allowed credit unions to offer many 
new services to their members and consequently compete with banks and savings 
and loans to become the member's primary financial center. 5 
Since credit unions now have such a large impact when competing for 
savings dollars, it is no longer enough to examine them with traditional bank 
examinati_on procedures. As the literature review indicates, proper management 
of these savings resources is vitally important to the continued success of 
credit unions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most of the literature dealing with critiques of the examination process 
is written about bank or thrift examinations. With the number of bank failures 
in 1984 the highest since the depression, consumers want assurances that their 
money is safe, and consequently examiners have come under close scrutiny. The 
1 i terature investigates the causes of the failures of Penn Square Bank in 
1982, Continental Illinois in 1984, and in 1985 Home State Savings Association 
of Cincinnati and Old Court Savings and Loan in Maryland. Findings suggest 
bank examiners face several problems which make effective examinations very 
difficult to achieve. 
After the failure of Franklin National Bank in 1974, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)--one of three federal agencies that regulate 
banks--reviewed and subsequently overhauled national bank examination techni-
ques. The revised procedures,developed by a "Big 8" accounting firm, emphasized 
good audit procedures and management review practices. The OCC Examiner Handbook 
describes the functions of the examination as "to provide an objective evaluation 
of a bank's soundness, ... to permit the OCC to appraise the quality of management 
and directors, ... and to identify those areas where corrective action is required 
to strengthen the bank, to improve the quality of its performance, and to 
6 
enable it to comply with applicable laws, rulings and regulations." Yet 
Dince, who is a former Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, points out that 
examinations have never proven to be an important deterrent to bank failure, 
while good management and good controls are the best defense. 7 This argument 
is supported by the statistics shown in Table I which indicate that over 61\ 
of all business failures are attributable to poor management. The lesson to 
be learned and the concern of credit union regulators should be that good 
management is in charge of credit unions. 
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TABLE 1 
REASONS FOR BUSINESS FAILURE 
REASON 
Management incompetence 
Lack of managerial experience 
Unbalanced experience in finance, sales, 
production 
Lack of experience in production line 
Neglect 
Disaster 
Fraud 
Other 
Source: Dun & Bradstreet, The Business Failure Record 
(New York): 1981, p. 12 
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PERCENT 
44.4 
16.8 
15.8 
14.9 
1.1 
0.6 
0.6 
5.8 
100.0 
Several articles point out the problems bank examiners face. The number 
of federal examiners is currently less than 4,400--down from about 5,000 in 
1980. 8 States also find they lack sufficient numbers of trained people to 
examine all their state-chartered financial institutions. The pressures on an 
examiner include lower pay than offered by private industry, grueling travel 
schedules, the necessity to complete examinations quickly, and lack of training 
and expertise necessary to keep up with the complex new activities in which 
banks are involved. 9 Examiners are also often intimidated by high-salaried 
bank executives and important board members. State regulators frequently lack 
clout to enforce prohibitions. For instance, in Ohio the state thrift superin-
tendent is a political appointee, and not a career state employee knowledgeable 
in savings and loan regulation. The board chairman of Home State contributed 
heavily to Governor Richard Celeste's 1982 election and thus used his influence 
in the choice of thrift superintendent. Despite examiner predictions of failure 
2! years in advance, a series of thrift superintendents extracted from Home 
State's board nothing but promises that abnormally overcollateralized invest-
ments would be reduced; in fact, more of these investments were purchased. 
Ohio legislative investigation must resolve why the board ignored the regulator 
10 
and consider making the superintendent a career person. 
Dince further points out that the various state and federal agencies 
don't share enough in format ion with each other. While there were obvious 
problems with the loans generated at Penn Square, the examiners responsible 
for the "upstream" purchasers at Continental Illinois, Chase Manhattan, and at 
other money centers were apparently not notified of the looming disaster. 
Dince also proposes that problem banks are underexamined while average banks 
are overexamined. This apparent deficiency is caused by the inflexibility of 
the examination system that, because of time scheduling, requires that loan 
review be limited by pre-determined dollar cut off amounts and also requires a 
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review of consumer protection regulations. The problem of secrecy-versus--
disclosure is a dilemma for CPA's who are being whipsawed by regulators on one 
hand who fear adverse information will create investor panic, and Congress on 
the other hand which clamors for full disclosure. In the fall of 1984 the 
Comptroller of the Currency required two of the nation's largest banks to 
disclose their capital inadequency. This reversal of position on disclosure 
by OCC is applauded by columnist Richard Reeves. He believes the market force 
of publ i r no inion will induce banks to "shape up" before problems arise, and 
thereby restore public confidence. The embarassment of a problem bank is less 
expensive than the recent trend of bailing out failed banks with public money. 
Knapp's article is addressed to those CPA's seeking or already engaging bank 
and savings and loan clients. He warns of the perils of dealing with 
inconsistent--and thus unpredictable--regulatory agencies, the lack of 
cooperation and communication between agencies, and the increased risk brought 
12 
about by deregulation. 
Edwards cites the breakdown of market segmentation as the reason for 
current regulatory pressures. Banks are diversifying into traditionally 
non-bank activities while transaction/deposit accounts have appeared in non-bank 
financial intermediaries (Sears, American Express, etc.). Additionally, re-
strictive branching laws are being circumvented by bank holding companies, or 
are becoming outdated with the use of electronic funds transfer and international 
banking. The implications of this diminished segmentation are elimination of 
distinctions between commercial banks and other financial institutions, in-
creased competition (with additional pressure on bank solvency), and some loss 
of control over monetary aggregates by the Federal Reserve. 
Additional articles on the examination process include Kristufek's discus-
sion of the procedures the Federal Home Loan Bank uses to limit the disruptive 
effect on operations as well as time spent in examined institutions. 
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The article notes that the audit function is left to independent auditors 
which allows examiners to focus on operations and management. Fair and McFarlane 
point out that public comments on proposed regulations are valued by regulators. 
Regulators often are not familiar with the operational effect regulations 
have; their request for comments gives management of regulated institutions 
the opportunity to provide information on possible effects of these regulations. 
Since proposed regulations are frequently modified, management input is a 
useful tool. 
While there are pertinent lessons for credit unions to learn from these 
documented difficulties of bank regulators, credit unions are a different type 
of financial institution. The need for good management is still a concern, 
but in credit unions the volunteer nature of management raises the question of 
where motivation and incentive comes from to correct problems and prevent 
failures. Credit unions use more than 500,000 volunteers nationwide, and with 
annual turnover approaching 30% managerial stability is a concern for regulators. 
Ideas for keeping these volunteers informed and motivated are presented in the 
d . . f . . . 13 September, 1985, e ition o Virginian. 
The pressures on credit union examiners are similiar to those of their 
banking and thrift counterparts. However, when dealing with credit union 
management, the intimidation and expertise factor usually favor the examiner. 
In other words, the non-professional nature of credit union management forces 
it to seek the professional advice of examiners, and examiners are willing to 
help. This willingness is one example of the spirit of the credit union 
industry, which is more concerned with the welfare of its members than with 
profits--and is thus set apart from all other financial institutions. 
The cooperation problems that the various state and federal bank and 
thrift regulators encounter are by and large absent in the credit union industry. 
The National credit Union Administration (NCUA) regulates federally chartered 
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credit unions, and administers the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund 
(NCUSIF) which insures members deposits up to $100,000. While there are many 
state chartered credit unions which are insured by NCUSIF, the NCUA does not 
examine them but rather accepts the state regulator's examination report. 
NCUA and the National Association of State Credit Union Supervisors (NASCUS) 
executed a Memorandum of Understanding on April 21, 1982, with an intent to 
"effect a program of uniform enforcement of various state [credit union) laws 
and the integrity of the (federal share) insurance fund." NCUA and NASCUS 
meet together semi-annually to resolve problems in the spirit of the memorandum. 
The U.S. General Accounting Office report to the Chairman of the National 
Credit Union Administration reviews NCUA's examination and regulatory procedures 
and makes recommendations in two areas: (1) better administrative procedures 
in resolution of ''problem" credit union situations, and (2) setting standards 
of acceptability for state examination programs. 14 NASCUS felt that this 
second recommendation should be developed by NASCUS, and not NCUA. Thus, 
NASCUS's 1983 Regulatory Development Committee composed the minimum standards 
report. The report defines as its goal the development of an examination 
scope as well as systems and/or procedures, the communication of findings, and 
remedies to resolve problems. Most of the report deals with defining of 
examination scope as shown in Table 2. Eighteen checkpoints to cover these 
areas are elaborated. Since none of these checkpoints focuses on analysis of 
management, it must be assumed that if one wishes to rate management, the 
rating must be derived from management's ability to set policies and direct 
operations in a manner which results in satisfactory ratings in the factors 
given in Table 2. The NASCUS Minimum Standards report is useful and should be 
considered in revision of any examination report. 
While there is public and regulatory concern with the record number of 
bank failures, credit union failures have not had, to date, significant economic 
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TABLE 2 
NASCUS's MINIMUM STATE CREDIT 
UNION EXAMINATION STANDARDS 
While not all inclusive, the following factors in defining the scope of the 
examination are considered most important: 
Historical soundness of the credit union 
• Equity position (Reserves, Undivided Profits, Special Reserves) 
• Delinquency percentage of the loan portfolio 
• Past history of sound operations 
• Stable management arid satisfactory rating 
of the Board of Directors 
• Functioning (and adequate) Supervisory Committee 
• History of compliance with Regulation Z, Regulation B, etc., 
and applicable state statutes and rules 
• Call Report and/or other annual reports of condition 
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or social impact. While the assets in the credit union industry have grown 
dramatically as previously indicated, recent statistics show over sixty percent 
of all credit unions have assets less than $1 million and account for less 
than ten percent of total industry assets. As mutual cooperatives, credit 
unions are not required to sell stock and capitalize at multi-million dollar 
minimums, while most banks and thrifts are. The fact that most failures are 
11 . d d. . is 16 . among sma -size ere it unions and newly chartered credit unions explains 
the minimal economic impact such failures have had. In Virginia in the ten 
year period ending in 1983 thirty-two new credit unions were chartered. Eight 
of these credit unions were liquidated and one merged into another credit 
union. Of the twenty-three remaining, only two had assets in excess of $1 
million (the larger one had $1.7 million in assets). Failures of these sizes 
have not put pressure on federal or private share deposit insurance funds, and 
credit union members have recovered their investments without much public 
attention. However, the failure of any of those credit unions larger in asset 
size than the share insurer who insures their deposits would have obvious 
economic and social impacts. Home State's failure and the inability of the 
Ohio private insurer to pay insured amounts without a governmental bailout 
exemplifies this fact. Deposit insurance is an issue of growing concern in 
the credit union industry. Public confidence in private (non-federal) deposit 
insurers is very low in the backlash of the Ohio and Maryland 1985 thrift 
failures, even though private and federal credit union deposit insurers are 
stronger than the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Savings 
and Loan Insurance Corporation. 
An accurate model using stepwise multiple regression analysis was devel-
17 
oped by Kharadia and Collins to forecast credit union failures. The 
significant variables were found to be dividend rate, liquidity ratio, delinquent 
loan ratio, assets, and membership variation. Small credit unions were found 
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to be more susceptible to failure (which supports findings cited above in the 
U.S. General Accounting Office report). It is also significant that 85\ of 
failed credit unions had management rated in "weak" or "unsatisfactory" 
categories when tested against NCUA's early warning system. A basic problem 
with this model is that the data used comes from a period ending in 1971, well 
before deregulation and other major changes in the industry occurred. This 
deficiency was also noted by Dr. Idol. 
18 
He contends in his critique of this 
model that since deregulation has been in effect the most predictive 
factors would be (1) return on assets, (2) rate sensitivity gap analysis, 19 
(3) capital strength, and (4) various delinquency and charged-off loan factors. 
Nevertheless, a couple of the significant variables found by the Kharadia 
and Collins model are used today to evaluate the operational strength of 
credit unions. The Illinois Department of Financial Institutions developed an 
evaluation system "designed to help credit unions regulate themselves, and to 
assist the regulator in monitoring credit union performance". 20 This system 
was incorporated almost in toto in NCUA's Financial Performance Report, which 
is generated by data given on call reports received from credit unions 
semi-annually. Table 3 gives the basic ratios used by NCUA to give a percentile 
ranking to credit unions. NCUA dropped Illinois' loan to share ratio (a 
traditional ratio still used by credit unions which is considered worthless by 
Dr. Idol because it ignores rate sensitivity--see footnote #19), and added the 
delinquency ratio. Note from Table 3 the importance given dividends (the 
payout ratio measures a credit union's ability to compete for savings dollars) 
and the delinquency ratio--both factors found to be significant in Kharadia and 
Collin's model. Erratic changes in the number of members still tend to 
disrupt operations significantly. This is particularly true in small credit 
unions where strikes, layoffs, and business recessions as well as rapid expansion 
(on the other extreme) are difficult for inexperienced management to handle. 
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Expenses 
Reserves 
Market Growth 
Reserves 
Capital 
Expenses 
Personnel 
Expenses 
Payout Ratio 
Charge Offs 
Delinquency 
TABLE 3 
NCUA FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE RATIOS 
Three year compounded growth rates 
of total income minus total expenses 
Five year compounded growth rates of 
reserves and undivided earnings minus assets 
Percentage increase (decrease) in total 
shares from the prior year 
Percentage increase (decrease) in total 
reserves and undivided earnings from the 
prior year 
Reserves and Undivided earnings divided 
by shares 
Total operating expenses divided by average assets 
Salaries and benefits as a percentage of 
gross income 
Dividends as a percentage of gross income 
Net charge offs divided by average loans 
Total delinquent loans as a percentage 
of total loans 
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METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study is to identify possible areas of improvement in 
the examination report used in Virginia state-chartered credit unions in 
order to enhance the Bureau of Financial Institution's ability to determine 
the fitness of a credit union and to provide a more useful tool for credit 
union self-examination. Two sources of expertise in evaluating exarninat ion 
reports are obvious: regulators and credit union management. Therefore, two 
surveys were developed to collect these group's opinions on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current examination report and process. 
One survey was sent to the 47 state credit union supervisors and to the 
Puerto Rican supervisor who are all members of NASCUS. (Delaware, South 
Dakota, Wyoming, and the District 9f Columbia do not have credit union statutes.) 
The survey asked the supervisors what, given several choices, they considered 
. 
the most important part of the examination; what they considered to be the 
strong and weak points of their examination report; what additions or deletions 
they would make to their report; how they rated their opinions on several 
items concerning the examination process; and finally for their subjective 
thought on what incentives are available to ensure good management in credit 
unions. In addition to the survey, a blank copy of their credit union 
examination report was requested for review as well as any criteria they used 
for a rating system. (See Appendix Al 
The second survey was to the board 1 of directors of the 122 state-chartered 
credit unions currently in operation in Virg1nia. The board was surveyed 
because they receive the examination report in the normal examination process. 
It was recommended to them that they review their recent examination report 
before answering the survey. For control purposes the survey first asked for 
placement of their credit union ir1 one of four asset ranges. This was done 
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because the needs of small credit unions are felt to be different from large 
credit unions. Next they were asked to indicate the services they provided to 
their members, and their degree of involvement with computers. Since the 
survey was sent to the board, they. were next asked who was completing the 
survey and who reads the examination report (a preception exists that paid 
treasurers or managers [or bookkeepers in small credit unions] run credit 
unions). Next, a rating from 1 to 4 of each report page was requested to 
determine .which pages were considered most and least important. They were 
also asked to select the ratios they considered most important from a group of 
ten commonly used in analyzing credit unions. A series of questions followed 
asking for a rating of their opinions on a number of items concerning the 
examination process. Many of these questions appeared on the regulator's 
survey as well in order to compare the opinions of regulators and credit union 
management. To gather more input, the same subjective question asked of the 
regulators about incentives to ensure good management was presented. Finally, 
the opportunity was given to comment on anything else about the examination 
report and process. (See Appendix B) 
It was originally conceived that a random sampling of state chartered 
credit unions in other states would also be surveyed. In addition, trade 
associations and private deposit guarantors were felt to have an interest in 
this study and thus the study might benefit from their input. Due to time 
constraints and the large number of potential members in the sample, these 
groups were eliminated. 
The participants in the survey were given thirty days to respond. 
-14-
DATA 
Of the 48 regulators surveyed, 31 responded (65\ response rate) and 16 
sent blank copies of their examination report for review. The results of the 
quantitative data are given in Table 4. Even though the first question asked 
for the most important aspect of credit union examination, 17 of the 31 
respondents checked two or more of the choices given: thus the results indicate 
how many times each choice was checked. In no case was management analysis or 
internal control analysis checked alone. A few respondents added short comments 
to four questions. The call report is already included in the examination 
report in one state while another state has its examiners submit a corrected 
call report with the examination report. While agreeing that standardized 
accounting should be required, one respondent felt there still must be some 
flexibility. Three respondents felt management's response to examiner's 
comments should be in the reply to the examination (i.e., after the final 
examination report is sent to the board). To the final question, one respondent 
indicated that a mandatory meeting with the board follows each examination. 
Although the surveyor hoped to get a definitive response, respondents 
gave a wide variety of answers to the question of strong points in their 
examination reports. In retrospect, this variety is to be expected since each 
state's examination report is unique. A number of subjective responses included 
directness, clarity, flexibility, brevity, and "findings and recommendations". 
A number of other responses could be categorized as strong in asset quality 
evaluation or financial analysis. 
The response to the question of weak points in the examination reports 
was also varied. It is noteworthy that seven respondents felt their reports 
had ~ weak points. No clear categorization of responses can be made, although 
five respondents did indicate internal control and data processing analysis to 
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TABLE 4 
RESULTS OF REGULATORS SURVEY 
What is the most important part of credit union examination? 
Asset quality 
Financial analysis 
Management analysis 
Internal Control analysis 
Compliance 
Should examiners advise or present 
options for problem resolution? 
Should examination results be disclosed 
to the public? 
Should the examination report be a 
reference or educational source? 
Should the call report be part of the 
examination report? 
Do communications to credit union 
boards or management clearly 
indicate their status? 
Does the examining staff have adequate 
familiarity with credit union operation 
and management? 
Should standardized accounting be 
required in credit unions? 
Should management's response to 
examiner's comments be included in 
the report? 
Are poor management procedures 
properly identified and clearly 
indicated to the board? 
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68\ 
48\ 
39\ 
23\ 
3\ 
97\ agree 
90\ disagree 
(55\ strongly) 
94\ agree 
(no one disagrees) 
42\ agree 
36\ no opinion 
94\ agree 
(only 32\ strongly) 
90\ agree 
(only 29\ strongly) 
(no one disagrees) 
68\ agree 
16\ disagree 
71\ agree 
(35\ strongly agree) 
19\ disagree 
90\ agree 
(only 16\ strongly) 
be weak; four of the five felt asset quality was the strong point and the 
important point of their examinations, and the fifth felt financial analysis 
to be strong and important. One interesting response emerged from two respon-
dents: the lack of proforma financial statements, projecting where a credit 
union will be in the future if present conditions continue, was felt to be ~ 
weakness. 
What the respondent would add to his examination report again elicited 
varied answers, but eleven respondents indicated the need to correct the problems 
just cited in the previous question. A majority of the respondents indicated 
a need to upgrade financial analysis. Two respondents wanted to perform more 
audit functions, and two thought more loan review was necessary. 
Only six respondents would delete anything from their reports. The surveyor 
surmises that there is reluctance to delete anything possibly worthwhile. The 
responses included deletion of an internal control questionnaire, investments, 
loan documentation exceptions (indicated twice), detail of reserve accounts, 
and listing of shares and loans (and balancing totals to the general ledger) • 
The final question on incentives available to ensure stable and knowledge-
able management and to promote problem resolution was answered by only eleven 
respondents. While "management" in the quest ion was intended to mean the 
volunteer board and committee members, several respondents introduced salaries 
as incentives; statutes prohibit anyone except the manager and staff from 
being paid. Five of the answers brought up participation in the state's 
credit union league and making usuage of the league's consultants, seminars, 
and schools. One respondent astutely observed that the dilemma for regulatory 
authorities is that they "have to rely almost entirely on criticism. Adminis-
trative action against an errant board is too costly and cumbersome to use 
very often." He further observes that, within his experience, the boards that 
do the best jobs come from the tightest common bonds. 
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Apparently, social 
pressure effectively deters poor management since board members do not like to 
face peers once poor credit union performance is established. (This observation 
is certainly a significant argument against field of membership expansion 
which has been so prevalent in recent years - expansion aimed almost ironically 
at providing better services to credit union members.) Another respondent's 
state proposes statutory accountability of the board of directors, who are not 
seen as being currently responsible to anyone. "The statute [would) allow a 
credit union to issue an 'at risk' - 'uninsured' membership share. A certain 
required portion of the credit union's net income would be allocated to these 
shareholders. 
depreciate." 
If the credit union loses money, the value of the share would 
To promote problem resolution, respondents suggested adminis-
trative directives, regular monitoring of submitted financial statements, cease 
and desist orders, memorandums of understanding, suspension of operations, and 
forced mergers or liquidations. These are traditional actions which have been 
used despite minimal economic and social effects. 
Of the 122 credit unions surveyed 59 responded (48\ response rate) . Table 
5 shows the rating given to each page in the current examination report. 
There was obviously a misunderstanding of this rating question. The surveyor 
intended that four pages would be ranked from 1 to 4 as most important in one 
column and four different pages would be likewise ranked as least important in 
the other column, but only three respondents answered as intended. The rest 
either gave each page a 1 to 4 ranking in one column or the other, or checked 
the pages as being most important or least important. To make use of the data 
provided, a scoring system was devised which assigned a 4 each time a page was 
rated either most or least important, a 3 each time a page was rated either 
second most or second least important, and so on, and a 2.5 was assigned for 
each check given a page. Page two was used as the standard to determine most 
important when rating discrepancies occurred since this page was rated more 
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Page 1-
Page 2-
Page 3-
Page 4-
Page 5-
Page Sa-
Page 6-
Page 7-
Page 8-
Page 9-
Page 10-
TABLE 5 
RANKING OF IMPORTANCE OF REPORT PAGES 
Most 
Important 
Rani< Score 
Credit Union and examiner balance sheets 4 114 
Examiner's comments 
Breakdown of page l asset categories 
Breakdown of page l asset and 
iiability categories; classifications 
Comparative Operating Statements 
Breakdown of charge-offs and recoveries 
Listing of delinquent loans 
Loan file documentation exception 
Insurance Coverages 
Members of the board, staff and 
committees and their share and 
loan balances 
Internal Control Checklist 
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l 174.5 
9 57.5 
11 52 
3 122.5 
5 108.5 
7 99 
8 78 
6 106 
10 54.5 
2 144 
Least 
Important 
Rank Score 
4 48.S 
11 8.5 
2 72 
3 70 
9 19.5 
7 36.5 
8 35.S 
s 43 
6 41.5 
l 73.S 
10 11 
than any other and was obviously considered most important. Based on the 
total "most" and "least" scores for each page the rankings shown in Table 5 
tend to verify each other (i.e., the examiner's comment page is ranked first 
in the most important column and last in the least important column, the page 
with board members, etc .. share and loan balances is ranked first in the least 
important column and next to last in the most important column, et cetera.) 
A notable exception is page one, which is ranked fourth in the most 
important column and fourth in the least important column. Since page one 
tends to be important in showing the effects of classifications, and the 
possibility exists that those credit unions who consider it unimportant may 
have had limited classifications, it is felt by the surveyor that the "most 
important" rating is more realistic. 
The survey found that nearly all board members do read the examination 
report. The manager reads the report nearly half the time, while the report 
is available to staff and the supervisory committee nearly 20% of the time. 
(The supervisory committee is required by law to perform an annual audit of 
the credit union.) The treasurer or manager filled out and responded to the 
survey in 48 out of the 59 samples (over 81%). This was expected: as pointed 
out above the perception exists that the paid individual is thought to run the 
credit union. 
As with the regulators, response was limited on the question concerning 
incentives to ensure stable and knowledgeable management and to promote problem 
resolution. Salary again was brought up as an incentive, even though the 
intent of the question was to find ways to motivate volunteers. Participation 
in credit union schools and workshops along with continuing education were given 
as answers. Also, some ideals were mentioned: "dedication," "honest effort", 
"self-motivation", "sense of pride and accomplishment." Several respondents 
suggested that problem resolution could be enhanced by more and better exami-
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nations and audits as well as board evaluations and reviews. 
The final open-ended question brought several additional responses. Exami-
ners were generally viewed as helpful, but some respondents indicated that 
they felt examiners may too severely criticize insignificant deficiencies or 
practices. In a few instances, board members suggested that they would like 
to see examiners use their expertise to offer suggestions to resolve problems. 
A few respondents thought the examiners should extend more praise when it is 
appropriate~ Finally, several respondents cautioned against examinations 
becoming too routine and suggested that the primary purpose should be to 
determine safety and soundness. 
The traditional credit union statistical ratios scored highest among the 
choices given in the survey; loans to shares, expense to income and delinquency 
percentages are all used by more than two-thirds of the respondents to assess 
their operations. Over 40% use capital to assets, dividends to income, and 
percentage changes in shares and capital as monitors. 
A quantitative summary of management's opinions about the examination 
process is presented in Table 6. 
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TABLE 6 
RESULTS OF CREDIT UNION SURVEY 
Is examination report referred to 
during the year? 
Should the examination report be 
a reference or educational source? 
Is more satisfaction gained from the 
examination report than from audit? 
Is the examination report credible 
(well written)? 
Should management's response to examiner's 
comments be included in the report? 
Would a rating of the credit union 
be helpful? 
Would inclusion of a correct call report 
in the examination report be helpful? 
Should more financial analysis be 
included in the examination report? 
Are detailed notes about delinquent 
loans helpful? 
Is a listing of all delinquents preferred 
whether classified or not? 
Is a summary of delinquents 
preferred to a listing? 
Is loan and credit review adequate? 
Is internal control analysis adequate? 
Are examiners adequately familiar with 
credit union operations? 
Should examiners present options for 
solving problems? 
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64% yes 
19% no 
85% agree 
51\ agree 
19% disagree 
83% agree 
(only 24% strongly) 
54\ agree 
11% disagree 
34\ agree 
17% disagree 
44% agree 
14% disagree 
66% agree 
19% disagree 
36\ agree 
37% disagree 
25% agree 
53% disagree 
54% agree 
31% disagree 
73% agree 
(only 14% strongly) 
15% disagree 
69% agree 
12% disagree 
83\ agree 
89\ agree 
TABLE 6 
(continued) 
Would a management analysis and rating 
by the examiners be helpful? 
Should examination results be disclosed 
to the public? 
Are communications from the examiner 
or regulator clear indicators of the 
credit union's status? 
Would standardized accounting be a burden? 
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78% agree 
(only 20\ strongly) 
15\ agree 
69\ disagree 
56\ agree 
(only 14\ strongly) 
25\ disagree 
29% yes 
32% no 
DATA INTERPETATION 
A comparison of the ratings in Tables 4 and 6 indicate that regulators 
and credit union management are reasonably similar in their thinking. The 
great majority of both think examiners should offer suggestions and present 
options for problem resolution, given their expertise from seeing many credit 
union operations. Respondents in both groups believe examiners have good 
familarity. with operating and managing a credit union. A relatively large 
number of both believe the examination report should be an educational and 
reference tool for the volunteers who serve on the board of directors and 
committees. Also, the survey indicates that the board reads the report. 
Some of the other numbers are not as large, but still continue to reflect 
similar thinking by regulators and management. On the question of public 
disclosure of examination results, 90% of the regulators don't think examination 
results should be disclosed, while only 69'\ of management thinks the same. 
Interestingly, 15% of management thinks results should be disclosed. These 
results may indicate that credit unions think they are financially sound. 
They may be willing to compete with and to be judged as any other financial 
institution. 
The use of a properly completed call report in the examination report 
itself did not seem to be controversal; however, over 40% of both groups 
believed it would be beneficial. Since the survey establishes that the 
examination report may be considered an educational and reference tool, inclusion 
of a properly completed call report is a way to make the examination report 
more educational. Numerous errors now found when the credit union completes 
the call report could be eliminated. Two states include it currently. It is 
the same report used semi-annually by NCUA and annually by other states to 
gather balance sheet, income statement, and other operational data for financial 
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analysis and rating. Thus the potential exists for the annual call report to 
be the first uniform examination document among all the states. 
While a majority of regulators and credit union management think that the 
credit union's status is clearly indicated by communications from the regulator, 
significant disparity exists: 94% of regulators think they communicate their 
findings clearly, but only 56% of management feels this way. Yet, 83\ of 
management feels the report is well written (but only 24\ feel strongly so). 
Regulators _may be overestimating their communications skills. Examiners fre-
quently see the same problem each year they visit a credit union. The survey 
results suggest that communication problems may contribute to the length of 
time--sometimes three or four examinations--it takes to resolve some problems. 
Since examiners at Penn Square knew of the problems over two years and two 
examinations prior to the failure, it is possible that clear and strong commun-
ications to the board could have been enough incentive to correct deficiencies. 
Again, regulators and management generally agree on the issue of including 
management's response to examiner comments in the report. Surprisingly 17\ 
more of the regulators felt that responses should be included in the report. 
It seems logical that management would welcome the opportunity to give explana-
tions. There are good reasons to allow feedback from management. There may 
be cases where comment is not necessary if there is a valid explanation. When 
management is already working on a problem, the need for regulation is reduced. 
Both groups expressed a desire to increase financial analysis in the 
examination report. Table 4 shows that regulators still seem to be influenced 
by the traditional bank examination concept of asset quality. However financial 
analysis is a strong second in their estimation and a number of regulators 
would like to add further financial analysis to their examination reports. 
Also, 66\ of management indicated that they would like more financial analysis. 
It is interesting that while 90 \ of the regulators thought poor management 
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practices were properly identified and clearly indicated to the board, 78\ of 
management feels the need for more management analysis and a management rating. 
About one-half of management have no opinion on a rating. The surveyor senses 
that many are unfamiliar with ratings, and indeed several respondents made 
notations they did not understand the question. Regulators rated management 
analysis third on their list of important aspects of examination, and scored 
it slightly more than half as important as asset quality. In light of Dince's 
assertion .(brought out in the literature review) that good management and good 
controls are the best defense against failure, regulators should probably 
reassess the importance of analyzing and rating management. 
Internal control rated low in the regulator's survey, and some regulators 
expressed a weakness in their examination reports in this area. The importance 
of internal control was not overlooked by management. Seventy percent rated 
internal control adequate. 
report page (see Table 5). 
It is also considered the second most important 
Standardized accounting is required of federally-chartered credit unions. 
The state regulators agree that it should also be required in state-chartered 
credit unions; 68% agreed and 20% disagreed. Voting by management was split 
fairly evenly, with 32% feeling standardized accounting would not be a burden 
and 29% feeling it would. Thirty-nine percent had no opinion. Standardized 
accounting is apparently not a significant issue, and would probably require 
the legislative process to implement it. 
Since one of the stated reasons for this study was to provide credit 
union management with meaningful information in the examination report, the 
rest of the survey of credit unions was designed to determine their needs. 
Since the industry generally acknowledges that many supervisory committees do 
not perform their audit functions adequately, the question was asked if more 
satisfaction was gained from the examination than from the audit. Not sur-
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prisingly, 51% of the credit unions responded in agreement. The importance of 
the examination in management's eye places pressures on examiners to perform 
some procedures not required of them. Examiners are not auditors as they are 
sometimes misconceived to be. Nevertheless, the necessity of moving into the 
audit function may become real for examinations of the future. 
Table 5 reveals some areas for revision in the current credit union 
examination report used in Virginia. Examiner's conclusions and recommendations 
are considered most important. As expected, comparative operating statements 
and balance sheets also rank high. Unexpectedly, the internal control checklist 
and insurance coverages were ranked higher than delinquency of loans. A 
priori, the surveyor and his colleagues felt that insurance and the listing of 
board members, etc., would be considered unimportant and that delinquency 
would rate highly since the delinquency percentage has been a key operating 
ratio in credit unions. Also unexpected was the low importance given asset 
and liability listings on pages three and four. These ratings do verify the 
other survey data. As previously indicated, the credit unions surveyed want 
more analysis of financial and managerial aspects of their operations. As 
indicated by the low rating of loan file documentation exceptions (Table 5), 
asset quality is rated low (as opposed to high by the regulators--see Table 
4.) 
The questions in Table 6 concerning delinquency were posed to determine 
how credit unions want the reporting of delinquent loans to be handled in the 
report. The responses do not provide a definitive answer. Despite the low 
rating given by management to delinquency (Table 5) the Kharadia and Collins 
failure model ranked it among the five most significant variables. Delinquency 
is a part of financial analysis. Since the percentage of delinquent loans to 
all loans is so small in some credit unions and does not threaten financial 
soundness, the accounting principal of materiality should be applied. Management 
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feels that examiners are too strict on immaterial items. However, where 
delinquents threaten solvency, all interested parties would certainly want a 
listing. 
Table 7 was developed to determine what services credit unions offer that 
require examiner knowledge and proficiency in analyzing. Obviously this list 
has expanded greatly from the traditional credit union of a couple decades ago 
which paid 6% on shares and made loans at 12%. While small credit unions are 
st ill typical, many now offer Christmas and vacation club accounts as well 
as automobile loans. As assets expand and the capital base can support more 
services, credit unions provide more member services and compete to be the 
member's primary financial source. Examiners and regulators must be prepared 
to deal with the changes and the pressures they create. 
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TABLE 7-
MEMBERSHIP SERVICES PROVIDED BY CREDIT UNIONS 
Service 
Auto Loans 
Real estate loans 
Credit Cards 
Lines of credit 
Group l: 
Group 2: 
Group 3: 
Group 4: 
Asset size key: 
Less than SS00,000 
SS00,000 to less than $2,000,000 
$2,000,000 to less than Sl0,000,000 
more than $10,000,000 
Respondents 
Providing Comments 
78\ 
37\ 
10\ 
37\ 
Provided by 53\ of group l 
and oll of grotlps 3 and 4 
Provided primarily by groups 3 
(62\) and 4 (100\) 
Provided only by groups 3 (15\) 
and 4 (67\) 
By far the primary provider is 
group 4 (83\) 
Variable rate loans 7\ Provided only by groups 3 and 4 
Split rate shares 
Share drafts 
Share certificates 
IRA' s 
Club Accounts 
Hand Posted 
shares and loans 
Computer batching 
In-house computer 
General ledger 
on computer 
22\ 
42\ 
32\ 
69\ 
27\ 
14\ 
19\ 
10\ 
None provided by group l 
Provided primarily by groups 3 (62\) 
and 4 (83\) 
Provided primarily by groups 3 (85\) 
and 4 (100\) 
Provided primarily by groups 3 
(69\) and 4 (100\) 
Provided by a majority of all 
Provided by 94\ of group 1 
Of those providing 75\ are in groups 2, 
none in groups 3 or 4 
Evenly spread amongst groups 
None in group l, evenly spread 
otherwise 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Proceedings to revise the Virginia credit union examination report should 
be started promptly. More emphasis should be placed on financial and managerial 
analysis, and communications to credit unions must be clear and effective. 
It is proposed that pages three and four, which list the assets and 
liabilities categorized on page one, be eliminated. In their place the annual 
call report should be completed using figures as of the examination date. 
This would show the credit union the proper usuage of the call report. The 
call report would be signed by a credit union official, indicating the figures 
are provided from the trial balance of the general ledger and also implying 
awareness and understanding of this report. Since page four currently also 
summarizes examiner classifications (adjustments) to the general ledger, these 
adjustments must be shown elsewhere in the report. The surveyor feels no 
clear explanation is provided for differences between "per book" and "per 
examiner" figures on page one; a third "adjustment" colunm between the other 
two would remedy this deficiency. 
The comparative operating statements on page five should be revised to 
the format used by Dr. Charles R. Idol to facilitate return on asset (ROA) 
analysis. Each credit union's Financial Performance Report (FPR), generated 
by NCUA' s computers using call report data, uses this format. Thus, to 
facilitate more financial analysis the most recent FPR should be included in 
the examination report with current ratios. The call report and FPR would 
become part of the examination report and provide financial data for analysis 
as well as a reference and educational source. 
Delinquent loans would be listed in the report only when delinquency is 
determined to have a major impact on credit union operations or solvency. 
Loan file documentation exceptions currently listed on page seven, would continue 
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to be reported only as examples for citation of major documentation problems; 
otherwise, documentation should be critiqued in the internal control section 
of the report. 
Listing of insurance coverages should continue as presently reported. 
Listing of board, staff, and committee members and their share and loan 
balances should be eliminated. Summary information necessary to indicate 
their qualification as well as to determine how well they are performing their 
duties and. responsibilities, can be included in the internal control section 
of the report. 
A "CAMEL" {capital-asset-management-earnings-liquidity) rating should be 
incorporated into the comment section of the report. Such a rating apparently 
is being used more and more by regulators, and management of credit unions 
indicate they would like to know "where they stand." 
The survey did not resolve the issue of management incentives. However,it 
is significant that the survey finds disparity between credit union management 
and regulators on their respective estimation of clarity of communications. 
Including management response to examiner's comments in the examination report 
can help to narrow the communications gap. It is important that management 
clearly understands their problems and knows how to resolve them. Since 
incentives to motivate volunteer management are lacking, examiner suggestions 
for improvement can clearly make problem resolution easier for management. 
Clear communications, acknowledged as understood, can be an effective regulatory 
tool. 
Many issues were raised by the surveys. A clear need for change in the 
present examination process is indicated. Hopefully, the recommendations pre-
sented in this paper can be incorporated into an improved credit union exam-
ination. 
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APPENDIX A 
l. \'.hat do you consider the most important part of credit 
union examination? 
asset quality 
-- financial analysis 
-- m'magement analysis 
-- internal control analysis 
-- other; please 1 ist 
2. \\hat is the strong point of your examination report? 
3. \\hat is the weak point of your examination report~ 
4. M"lat \o.Ould you add to your examination report? 
5. \'hat \o.Ould you delete frcm your examination report? 
Please indicate your feeling about the follcwing by 
circling the nurrber if you: 
1--strongly agree 
2--agree 
3--don't have an opinion 
4--disagree 
s--strongly disagree 
6. Do you think examiners should advise or present options 
for problem resolution? 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. If it were allcwable, should the results of examinations be disclosed 
to the public? 
(and let the marketplace decide where to invest its furrls) 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Do you think the examination report should be 
(among other things) a reference or educational source for 
credit union boards and management? 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. 00 you believe inclusion of your call report in the 
examination report - properly cc:rnpleted using data as 
of the examination date - 'MJuld be beneficial to the credit union? 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. 00 you believe that your ccmnunications to credit 
union boards or management are clear indicators of 
their status? 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Do· you believe your staff has adequate familiarity with 
credit union operations and nanagment? 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Do you think standardized accounting should be required 
in credit unions? 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Do you believe it is i.rrportant to have management's 
response to the examiner's ccmnents included in the report? 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Do you believe poor management procedures are properly 
identified and clearly indicated to the credit union board? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please share any thoughts you might have: 
15. Mlat incentives are availabe to ensure stable, kna..Jledgeable 
managefiellt in credit unions and to pranote prc:blem resolution? 
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APPENDIX B 
EXAMINATICN REroR'l' 'f:VAI.1JATICN CUESTICNNAIRE 
1. Please indicate the asset size of your credit union: 
less than $500,000 
$500,000 to less than $2,000,000 
__ $2,000,000 to less than $10,000,00 
__ rrore than $10,000,000 
2. Please indicate which services your credit union provides: 
auto loans 
real estate loans 
VISA or MasterCard 
line of credit loans 
variable rate loans 
(rate autanatically changes with rroney rtarket conditions) 
split rate shares 
- (dividend rate increases as minimum share deposits are maintained) 
share drafts 
share certificates 
IRA's 
club accounts 
3. Please indicate your usuage of canputers: 
no canputerization--shares and loans hand-posted 
- shares and loans on batch ccrnputer system 
- (no terminals in credit union off ice) 
shares and loans on-line carp.iter system 
-- shares and loans in-house canputer system 
::::::= general ledger on-line or in-house ccrnputer system 
4. ~o reads the examination report? 
board members 
- president 
- treasurer or chief financial officer 
- m:ma.ger (if different from above) 
- staff heads 
::::::= other: please list;.._ __ _ 
5. W10 is responding to ·.this. questiormaire? 
president 
-- treasurer or chief financial officer 
--- manager (if different from above) 
- other 
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6. Please rate fran l to 4 tl1e pages in the examination report that you fee 1 
are: 
page 1--credit union and examiner balance sheets 
page 2--examiner's canrrents 
page 3--breakdown of page 1 asset categories 
page 4--breakdown of page 1 asset and liability 
categories; classifications 
page 5.--canparative operating statements 
page Sa--breakdown of charge-offs and recoveries 
page 6--listing of delinquent loans 
page 7--loan file dcx:;umentation exceptions 
page 8--insurance coverages 
page 9--rrernbers of the board, staff, carmittees, 
and their share and loan balances 
page 10--internal control checklist 
most 
important 
least 
important 
7. Wiat statistical ratios do you feel are important in assessing your credit 
union's operations? 
__ loan to shares 
__ capital to assets 
__ incane to expense 
___ delinquent loans to total loans 
__ delirquent loans to capital 
__ earning assets to assets 
___ .return on assets (OOA) 
dividends to incare 
---
__ _.percentage change in shares over the past year 
__percentage change in capital over the past year 
__ other: please list _______________ _ 
Please indicate your feelings about the following by circling the nurrber 
if you: 
1--strongly agree 
2--agree 
3--don't have an opinion 
4--disagree 
5--strongly disagree 
8. Co you refer to the examination report during the year? 
l 2 3 4 5 
9. Co you think the examination report should be (among other things) 
a reference or educational source? 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 · Do you feel that you gain rrcre satisfaction from the examination report 
than fran your audit? 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Is the examination report credible? (correct, clear, consistent, complete) 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Ybuld your like to have your management's response to the examiner's 
canrrents and criticisms included in the examination rei)ort? 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Ybuld a rating (CAMEL, EWS Code, etc.) of your credit union help you? 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Ybuld inclusion of the BF!' s year end "cal 1 report" in the examination 
report--properly completed using data as of the examination date--be helpful 
to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Should rrcre financial analysis of your credit union be included in the 
examination report? 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Is it helpful to have the examiner list with delinquent loans collateral, 
extension agreemmts, judgements, and principal payment dates and amounts? 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Do you prefer to have all delinquent loans listed--classified or not? 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. Rather than list delinquent loans, \t.OUld you prefer a sunmary? 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Do you think loan documentation and credit analysis review by the 
examiners is adequate? 
l 2 3 4 5 
20. Do you think revitw of internal controls is adequate and meaningful? 
l 2 3 4 5 
21. Do you think the examiners have adequate familiarity with credit union 
operations and rranagerrent? 
l 2 3 4 5 
22. Do you think the examiners should present options for solving problems? 
l 2 3 4 5 
23. Would an.analysis and rating by the examiners of various management 
functions and practices be helpful? 
l 2 3 4 5 
24. If it \..ere allowable should the results of examinations be disclosed to the 
public? 
(and let the marketplace decide where to invest its funds) 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Do you peceive that carrnunications fran the examiner or 
regulator are clear indicators of your credit union's status? 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. WJuld the requirerrent of standardized accounting be a 
burden to your credit union? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please feel free to share your thoughts on the fol lowing o..u questions: 
27. W'lat incentives are available to ensure stable, knowlegeable management 
in credit unions and to prarote problem resolution? 
28. Other ccmnents you might have on the examination process and report: 
W'lat \twQUld you like to see added, deleted? 
W'lat do you like, dislike about the process? 
Are the examiners any problem? 
W'lat concerns do you have? 
etc. 
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1. A Profile of State Credit Union Supervisory Agencies. A study by 
the National Association of State Credit Union Supervisors and Credit Union 
National Association. June, 1984, pp. 1-2. 
2. Ibid., p. 40. 
3. Ibid., p. 51. 
4. Interview with William F. Stark, Executive Vice President, Virginia 
Credit Union League, Lynchburg, Virginia, November 26, 1985. Mr. Stark quoted 
from statistics supplied by CUNA Economics and Research Department dated July 
31, 1985. 
5. This growth has come at a time when "more banks failed (in 1984) 
than at any time since the depress ion and ... the strength of the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation is questioned daily." "Credit Unions' 
Success Puzzles Some," Virginian, 6 (April, 1985), p. 2. 
6. Dince, Robert R., "Penn Square, Upstream Lending, and the Bank Exam-
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.19 8 5 ) , p • 9 . 
14. The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS)--NASCUS' s counterpart 
in the banking industry--recently introduced a program to accredit state bank 
regulatory procedures. This program intends to demonstate to Congress state 
competence in examination procedures. "CSBS Announces Accreditation Program," 
NASCUS Stateliner, XI (January, 1985) ,p. 3. 
15. U. S. General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman of the 
National Credit Union Administration, "Stronger Supervision of Credit Unions 
Needed," October 6, 1982 (document GAO/GGD-83-12), p. 3. Of 220 involuntarily 
liquidated federal credit unions in 1980 only 15 had assets in excess of $1 
million. 
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16. Ibid., p. 4. Over 50% of involuntarily liquidated federal credit 
unions during 1978-1980 had been chartered within ten years of their liquid-
ation. 
17. Kharadia, V.C., and Robert A. Collins, "Forecasting Credit Union 
Failures," Journal of Economics and Business, 33 (winter, 1981), pp. 147-151. 
18. Interview with Dr. Charles R. Idol, Chief Economist for the Texas 
Credit Union League and Affiliates, Dallas, Texas, August 6, 1985. 
19. Idol, Charles R., "Alternatives to Expense/Income and Loan/Share 
Ratios in Analyzing Credit Union Profitability and Rate Sensitivity," Texas 
Credit Union League and Affiliates, Dallas, Texas. Rate sensitive assets 
(RSA) are variable-rate loans with yields that change with money market 
conditions, ·and investments maturing within six months. Rate sensitive funds 
(RSF) are deposits and borrowing with costs that respond to short-term interest 
rates. The rate sensitive gap (RSGAP) equals RSA minus RSF, and the RSGAP 
ratio is RSGAP divided by total assets. When this ratio is large, the gross 
spread (asset yield less cost of money) is vulnerable to small changes in 
money market rates. 
20. "Evaluations Help Credit Unions," Credit Union Magazine, 47 
(September, 1981), p. 36. 
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